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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code section 78 A-4103Q) (2008).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court erred in rejecting Crusher Rental & Sales, Inc.'s

("Crusher") attempt to bind Syndicate to Crusher's default judgment against BCM, where
Syndicate was BCM's indemnitor and surety and had notice and an opportunity to defend
BCM.
Standard of Review. This issue presents a question of first impression in
Utah; however, Crusher believes that that court's decision involves a pure question of
law, which this Court should review for correctness. See Armed Forces Ins. Exch. v.
Harrison, 2003 UT 14, f 27, 70 P.3d 35. To the extent the Court finds the issue was not
adequately preserved until the filing of Crusher's motion to alter or amend the judgment
under Rules 59(a)(7) and 52(b), the issue is reviewed for abuse of discretion; however,
where a trial court's decision is based on an error of law, it is an abuse of discretion for
the trial court to refuse to amend its judgment. See Crestwood Cove Apartments Bus.
Trust v. Turner, 2007 UT 48, ffi[40-41, 164 P.3d 1247.
Preservation. Crusher preserved this issue throughout the proceedings, but
most specifically when the trial court ordered the parties to submit supplemental
argument on the issue following the trial, and through its motion to alter or amend the
judgment under Rules 59(a)(7) and 52(b). (R. 874-881, 1048, 1108-1122, 1130-1145,
1246-1259,1315.)
SLC_254368.1
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2.

Whether the trial court erred in denying Crusher's Motion to Disqualify

Syndicate's trial counsel as fatally and irreconcilably conflicted.
Standard of Review. Claims of conflict of interest leading to
disqualification involve mixed questions of fact and law in which a trial court is generally
given limited discretion. See Houghton v. Dep't. of Health, 962 P.2d 58, 61 (Utah 1998).
Discretion is further limited where the historical facts and circumstance of the prior
representation are largely undisputed. See id. And, under the circumstances presented in
this matter, the conflict should create a per se presumption of prejudice and under these
circumstances, the trial court's decision should be reviewed for correctness.
Preservation. This issue is preserved at R. 44-58, 73-78, 1313.
3.

Whether the trial court's findings of facts are sufficient to support its

ultimate conclusion that Crusher was unjustly enriched by the actions of Syndicate in this
matter.
Standard of Review. Although findings of fact are reviewed for clear
error and upheld in the absence of such error, see Butler, Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp. v.
Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co., 909 P.2d 225, 228 (Utah 1995), this Court reviews
whether findings of fact are sufficient to support the trial court's ultimate conclusion for
correctness. See, e.g., State v. Real Prop, at 633 East 640 North, Orem, 942 P.2d 925,
931 (Utah 1997).
Further, although a trial court is given broad discretion in its application of unjust
enrichment law to the facts of any particular case, see Desert Mirah, Inc. v. B & L Auto,
Inc., 2000 UT 83,ffif9-12, 12 P.3d 580, the evidence must still support the trial court's
2

ultimate conclusion, see Smith v. Grand Canyon Expeditions, Co., 2003 UT 57, f 34, 84
P.3dll54.
Preservation. Crusher preserved its challenge to the finding through its
objection to the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. (R. 1021-22.)
STATEMENT OF DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
This appeal presents no questions implicating either the interpretation of either
statutory authority or constitutional provisions.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND DISPOSITION
BELOW.
This case arose out of a failed transaction in which a company known as

Buttonwillow Compaction Materials ("BCM") attempted to rent a piece of equipment
and purchase related equipment from Crusher Rental & Sales, Inc. Specifically, the case
concerns competing claims to the deposit Crusher received from Adventure Partners, Ltd.
for the equipment. A company known as Syndicate Exchange Corp. ("Syndicate") filed
this action after having entered into a an agreement with Buttonwillow Compaction
Materials ("BCM") through which BCM assigned all of its rights and obligations
pursuant to its relationship and dispute with Crusher to Syndicate. Syndicate agreed to
indemnify BCM from all costs and harm and to defend BCM against any liability related
to the dispute, rendering Syndicate BCM's indemnitor and surety in the dispute. See
Assignment, attached hereto as Addendum A.

3

After Syndicate filed this action, Crusher moved to disqualify Syndicate's
attorneys on the grounds that a member of the firm representing Syndicate was
previously Crusher's outside general counsel. The trial court (Judge Eves presiding) held
an evidentiary hearing and after which it denied the motion to disqualify. It instructed
Syndicate's counsel to prepare an order, which was never done.
During the course of the litigation, Crusher brought BCM in on a third party
complaint, and obtained a default judgment against BCM in the amount of the deposit.
Syndicate never challenged the complaint or the default judgment. A two day bench trial
was held in which the trial court (Judge Westfall presiding) entered judgment against
Crusher and in favor of Syndicate, refusing to apply the BCM default judgment against
Syndicate. Crusher moved to alter or amend the judgment under Rules 59(a)(7) and
52(b),which the trial court granted in part, resulting in an amended judgment and
findings. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, attached as Addendum B;
Judgment attached as Addendum C. Crusher timely appealed.
II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

Circumstances Leading to the Litigation

In December 2004, Larry Eilers ("Eilers"), at the time an employee of Crusher
Rental & Sales, Inc. ("Crusher") (R. 1309 Tr. 147), was approached by Gene Kause
("Kause"), as an agent of a company known as Buttonwillow Compaction Materials,
LLC ("BCM"), who sought to purchase a machine to crush and reclaim old concrete. (R.
1309 Tr. 157-58.) After the initial contact, Eilers and Kause communicated several times
by telephone and through these communications, Eilers came to understand, in part, the

4

scope of Kause's requirements. (R. 1309 Tr. 158.) Eilers quickly traveled to Kause's
worksite, near Bakersfield, California, to examine the work-site and meet Kause's
principal, Shawn Broderick ("Broderick"). (R. 1309 Tr. 159.) During that meeting,
Eilers learned that Kause would be his contact for BCM, that Broderick knew little about
the crushing business, and that Broderick and Kause needed crushing equipment
immediately. (R. 1309 Tr. 159-60.) Eilers determined that Kause and Broderick's needs
could be met by a "Crushboss 5056," (the "Crushboss"), which is a horizontal impact
crusher designed for high production jobs. (R. 1309 Tr. 161-62.) Crusher exclusively
designs and produces the Crushboss. (R. 1311: 161-62.) Eilers then suggested that a
rental plan might afford Kause and Broderick the best option, given their experience and
the requirements of the job. (R. 1309 Tr. 164.)1 Eilers discussed this option with Kause
and Broderick on December 14, 2004, and sent them an offer in writing on December 15,
2004, detailing that the monthly rental cost would be $25,000.00. (R. 1309 Tr. 165;
1294; Trial Ex. 7.) In addition, because regular maintenance of a Crushboss is essential
to its operation, Eilers informed Kause and Broderick that they would be required to
purchase certain equipment necessary to the operation and repair of the Crushboss for an
additional $356,500.00. (R. 1309 Tr. 166; Trial Ex. 7.) Finally, Eilers informed Kause
and Broderick that to consummate their rental agreement, BCM would have to provide a
rental deposit for the Crushboss in the amount of $37,500.00 (deposit of $12,500.00 plus

1

The Crushboss machine was valued at over $800,000.00 by Crusher at the time
of the negotiations. (R. 1309 Tr. 179.)
5

first month's rent of $25,000.00) along with a deposit of $17,825.00 for the equipment.
(R. Trial Ex. 7.) Thus, the total deposit required was $55,325.00. (R. Trial Ex. 7.)
On December 20, 2004, Crusher received a $55,325.00 wire transfer from an
unfamiliar entity, Adventure Partners Ltd., a Texas company. (R. 1137, 1310 Tr. 306.)
Crusher deposited the funds in a secure account and awaited further contact, during
which time Crusher attempted to ensure that BCM had sufficient assets to secure
payment for the equipment, only to learn that BCM's credit was insufficient to secure the
transaction. (R. 1294-95; 1312 Tr. 425-27.) On December 27, 2004, Kause travelled to
Cedar City and called Eilers, asking to take possession of the Crushboss. (R 1309 Tr.
212.) Eilers refused because BCM had not yet paid for the equipment and the
Crushboss—an $800,000 machine—was not sufficiently secured, not only because BCM
lacked sufficient credit, but also because Crusher had not yet received a signed rental
agreement from BCM. (R. 1311 Tr. 213.) Kause assured Eilers that the deal would be
consummated and that BCM would obtain financing, and he insisted that Crusher decline
other offers to purchase or rent the equipment and Crushboss. (R. 1296.) Due to Kause's
insistence, Crusher removed the Crushboss from stock, and declined to rent or sell the
equipment to at least one legitimate existing customer. (R.1296.) On January 12, 2005,
in a letter to BCM, Eilers renewed Crusher's commitment to working with BCM and

7

•

On December 16, 2004, unbeknownst to Crusher, BCM entered into a joint
venture agreement with Syndicate, through which Syndicate agreed to advance to BCM
$55,325.00 to secure the Crushboss (R. 1134), which resulted in that amount being wired
to Crusher from Adventure Partners, Ltd. (R. Trial Ex. 2.)
6

recognized that BCM had substituted a new entity—Chapman Summit, LLC—as the
principal in the deal. (R. 94; Trial Ex. 15.)
By January 13, 2005, after Chapman Summit, LLC had been substituted for BCM,
Broderick emailed Crusher and requested the return of the deposit. (R. 1296; Trial Ex.
9.) Crusher refused to refund the deposit because it believed BCM and Crusher had an
agreement that the deposit was nonrefundable to hold the Crushboss and equipment off
the market for immediate availability to BCM, which prevented Crusher from conveying
or leasing that crusher and equipment to other customers. (R. 1311 Tr. 220:16-19, 226:58, 227:23-25, 228:1-25, 265:18-21.) On January 18, 2008, David Silberstein, via email,
contacted Eilers to assure him that attempts to secure financing were ongoing, and that
Crusher should keep the deposit. (R. 103; Trial Ex. 22.) Silberstein also sought
additional information concerning the refundability of the deposit. (Id.) Upon learning
that Crusher considered the deposit nonrefundable, Silberstein demanded refund of the
full amount, ostensibly to Adventure Partners, Ltd. (R. 1311: Tr. 42.)
On March 23, 2005, BCM and Syndicate entered into an agreement entitled
"Assignment of Cause of Action" (the "Assignment") through which BCM assigned "all
of its interests, right and title in the Claims [involving Crusher] to [Syndicate]." (R.
1134; See also Trial Ex. 79: Addendum A.) BCM also delegated to Syndicate "all of [its]
rights in, and duties, obligations, and responsibilities of performance, if any, under the
Claims." (Id.) In return, Syndicate agreed to "assume or perform those duties,
obligations and responsibilities as if it had been the original party to the applicable
claims." (Id.) Syndicate also agreed to
7

indemnify, hold harmless and defend [BCM] against any and all
claims, costs, debts, deficiencies, duties, expenses, fees, injuries,
liabilities, losses, obligations, penalties, recoveries, or responsibilities,
including, but not limited to, attorney's fees and disbursements,
arising out of, concerning or relater in any way to the Claims and
[Syndicate's] prosecution of the Claims from and after the effective
date of this Assignment.
(Id.) With the Assignment in hand, Syndicate filed suit against Crusher on
April 18, 2005. (R. 1.)
B.

The Conflict with Syndicate's Counsel

Syndicate retained the law firm Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy to
represent it in this matter. (R. 1.) Attorney Scott Lilja is associated as a shareholder at
Van Cott. (R. 1313 Tr. 43.) Lilja also served as Crusher's long-time attorney and outside
general counsel. (R. 1313 Tr. 19-27.) After being served with this lawsuit, Crusher
immediately moved to disqualify Van Cott on the grounds that Lilja's association with
the firm created an imputed and irrefutable conflict of interest that Crusher would not
waive. (R. 44-58.) The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion which
revealed the following facts relevant to the motion to disqualify. (R. 1313.)
Crusher was incorporated in 1990. (R. 57; 1313 Tr. 6:2-9.) Its president
throughout is existence has been John Gazlay, (R. 1313 Tr. 6:2-9.) and Steve L. Gilbert
has been its CEO, secretary/treasurer, and a member of its board of directors throughout
that time. (R. 57; 1313 Tr. 22:17-23.) Mr. Gilbert is also the president of Gilbert
Development Corporation, which owns the controlling shares in Crusher. (R. 56-57;
1313 Tr. 22:2-16.)
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From approximately 1990 to 2000,3 Lilja represented Crusher as its attorney in a
variety of matters. (R. 1313 Tr. 23:2-11, 16:18-20.) According to Gazlay, Lilja was
integral in "helping to create the manner in which Crusher Rental and Sales did
business." (R. 1313 Tr. 19:13-18.) Lilja was Crusher's outside general counsel who
represented Crusher in litigation matters as well as corporate strategy and business
planning. (R. 57; 1313 Tr. 23:20-24.) Specifically, because Crusher was a new
company, it relied on Lilja's advice for a variety of matters in how to best structure its
business. (R. 1313 Tr. 24:5-25; 25-27.) This included advice on everything from
contract issues, to bankruptcy, to tax, to insurance, to structuring rentals, to litigation
prevention. (R. 1313 Tr. 10:1-21, 11:7-21, 12,24-27.) Specific to the renting and selling
of equipment, Lilja provided advice on the structure of contracts, and advised Crusher to
ensure it received sufficient down payments as security. (R. 1313 Tr. 9:23-25; 10:1-21;
11:14-21; 12:1-4,20-25; 13:1-2; 20-24; 27:14-22.) This included structuring rentals to
prevent lessees from tying-up or claiming ownership interests in leased equipment. (R.
1313 Tr. 25:9-14.) According to both Gazlay and Mr. Gilbert, they continue to utilize
Lilja's advice. (R 1313 Tr. 10:1-9, 25:18-23.)
In addition, Lilja represented Crusher in at least two litigation matters. (R. 1313
Tr. 6:20-25, 7, 8:1-9, 33:6-25, 34:1-20, 45:3-25, 46:1-24.) Both cases involved property
The exact starting date and ending date of the representation is unclear.
Witnesses at the evidentiary hearing testified that it was anywhere from 1992 to the late
1990s (R. 1313 Tr. 7-8 (testimony of Gazlay)); 1990 to 2000 (R. 1313 Tr. 23:8-19
(testimony of S. Gilbert)); and 1993 to 2001 (R. 1313 Tr. 44:14-25, 45:3-6,48-49
(testimony of Lilja).) There was agreement that there had been no conversations after
2000, and that Lilja returned a retainer deposit in 2001. (R. 1313 Tr. 36:18-21; 50:14-25,
51:1-5.)
9

damage and Crusher was the plaintiff in both matters. (See id.) Initially, the cases were
filed together in late 1993: they were then split, with one removed to federal court. (R.
1313 Tr. 45:3-25, 46:1-25.) Both actions were eventually dismissed, one in 1994, and the
other by stipulation in 1998. (See id.)
Throughout that time, Lilja also represented Gilbert Development Corporation,
Mr. Gilbert individually, Cyndi Gilbert individually (Ms. Gilbert is Crusher's in-house
counsel and was trial counsel in this case), as well as other companies controlled by Mr.
Gilbert—Diamond G Rodeos Inc., and Diamond G Ranches, Inc. (R. 1313 Tr. 23:12-19,
44:9-25, 45:1-3, 47:4-25, 48:1-22.) This representation has included representation on
litigation matters. (R. 57; 1313 Tr. 23:12-19, 34:21-25, 35:1-16, 45-47,48:1-22.) Lilja
represented both Steve and Cyndi Gilbert individually in 1996 in a case in which the
Gilberts were the plaintiffs. (R. 1313 Tr. 34:25, 35:1-18, 47:2-19.) In the early 1990s
Lilja represented Ms. Gilbert in a malpractice action filed against her arising out of a
bankruptcy case. (R. 1313 Tr. 44:14-25, 46:14-24.) After its conclusion, he then
represented her against the law firm that brought the malpractice action in a lawsuit
alleging wrongful use of civil proceedings. (R. 1313 Tr. 48:1-22; see also Gilbert v. Ince,
1999 UT 65, 981 P.2d 841.) That case went to trial and was appealed to the Utah
Supreme Court, ending in the issuance of a written opinion in 1999. (See id.)
One of Mr. Gilbert's concerns during this matter was that Lilja was privy to and
knowledgeable about Crusher's (and the Gilbert's) methods for developing trial strategy
and approach to litigation. (R. 1313 Tr. 27:3-22.) Neither Crusher nor Mr. Gilbert has

10

waived any conflict or privilege arising from their attorney-client relationship with Lilja.
(R. 58; 1313 Tr. 15:18-20, 31:22-15, 32:1-3.)
Lilja was associated with a different firm when Crusher initially retained him to
represent Crusher and its related persons and entities. (R. 1313 Tr. 43:12-19.)
Thereafter, he joined Atkin & Lilja. (R. 1313 Tr. 43:12-19.) In 2001, Atkin & Lilja
broke up as a result of that break-up, Lilja discovered that he had a retainer from Crusher
in his trust account. (R. 1313 Tr. 49:1-22.) He called Mr. Gilbert and returned the
retainer and from there went to work with the firm Perry Anderson & Mansfield. (R.
1313 Tr. 36:6-11, 49:1-22.) Lilja joined Van Cott in July 2002 (R. 1313 Tr. 43:12-19)
but has had no substantive contact with Crusher or the Gilberts since returning the
retainer to Crusher; he has, however, kept in contact by sending Christmas cards and a
book. (R. 1313 Tr. 50:14-25, 51:1-5
In April 2005, Van Cott filed this action against Crusher on behalf of its client,
Syndicate. (R. 1-9.) As detailed above, Syndicate's Complaint contained several
allegations and causes of action related to BCM's attempted rental of a Crushboss and
purchase of other equipment from Crusher, and in particular, the complaint focused on
the disposition of the deposit paid to Crusher on behalf of BCM. (R. 1-9.)
At the hearing on the motion to disqualify, Lilja testified that he had reviewed the
Complaint but saw nothing in it related to any matter that he had handled for Crusher or
the Gilberts. (R. 1313 Tr. 51:6-24.) While Lilja could recall only his litigation
representation, he did not and could not dispute any of the testimony Crusher presented
concerning the scope of his representation and the advice that he had provided to Crusher
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as its outside general counsel over the years. (R. 1313 Tr. 43-59.) Specifically, he
testified:
Q.
Do you see any reason to believe that the manner in which Crusher
Rental and Sales does business could not come under the auspices of an
attorney/client privilege with advice that you gave Crusher Rental and Sales as its
set up, its contracts or its way of doing business?
A.
I don't frankly recall those conversations. I don't know the context
in which they occurred, and I don't know whether or not they are privileged, so I
really can't answer the questions.
Q.

But they - you may not recall it, but they could have happened?

A.
I - it's possible, but I have no recollection of conferring on contracts
in particular. I do recall the litigation.
Q.
. . . [W]hen you were involved with Crusher Rental and Sales back
in its infancy, do you have any reason to dispute Mr. Gilbert and Mr. Gazlay's
testimony that they would have asked you questions about how to set up their
business and the contractual - contracts that they drafted to protect themselves, not
only from bankruptcy, but from litigation in general?
A.
I have no basis on which to dispute or confirm because ] don't
remember the conversations.
Q.

But they could have happened?

A.

That's - yes, that's a possibility.

(R. 1313 Tr. 54:22-25, 55:1-22.)
The trial court had its own questions for Lilja:
THE COURT:
. . . is there anything about your relationship in the past
with Mr. Gilbert or his entities that would create in your mind a question as to
whether you ought to be involved, or your firm involved in this new case.
THE WITNESS:
No. Having reviewed the matters on which I recall
representing Crusher, which was primarily a litigation matter, and having
reviewed the complaint in this matter, I do not see any substantial factual
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relationship between the two matters.
(R. 1313 Tr. 58:9-18.)
In addition, the trial court asked its own questions of Mr. Gilbert at the hearing on
the motion to disqualify.
THE COURT:
Okay. Let me just a question to clarify what you just
said in my own mind. Are you suggesting that you've told Mr. Lilja something
about Syndicate Exchange Corporation vs. Crusher Rentals and Sales that would
be harmful to you? Have you discussed this case with him at all?

THE WITNESS:

No.

THE COURT:

Have you ever discussed this issue with him?

THE WITNESS:

I have not.

THE COURT:
Okay. So is there information about this particular
case that Mr. Lilja has been given in confidence?
THE WITNESS:
Well, other than how we can put the contract together
and on taking down deposits on equipment, and then how to operate that, to stay
out of these very - this very where we're at today, we used his legal advice to run
our business accordingly.
THE COURT:

But you haven't discussed this ca^e -

THE WITNESS:

No, sir.

THE COURT:

-- particularly.

THE WITNESS:

No, sir.

THE COURT:

Okay. So your concern is that he might have

information about how you set up your contracts and operate your business THE WITNESS:

Correct.

THE COURT:
~ which might be harmful to you in this case?
THE WITNESS:
That's exactly correct. That he - the information,
then, the legal advice we used we're still relying on today that - and it wouldn't
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even come into this case as to why we operated under the terms in which we
operated.
THE COURT:

Are you being sued in this current case based on a

contract that THE WITNESS:

There is no contract.

THE COURT:

— that you issued? There's no contract?

THE WITNESS:

There's no contract.

THE COURT:
Okay. So we're not talking about a contract here that
Mr. Lilja helped set up?
THE WITNESS:
Well, we are in fact, because you go back to - if I
recall, part of this talks about a lease bill. Well, it goes back to the fact that he
didn't want us in leases, it was rentals. Secondly is it's [sic] to the deposits and
how to acquire them to cover ourselves on deposits, and that's certainly an issue in
this case.
THE COURT:

Do you anticipate that you would be calling him as a

witness as to any legal advice he may have given you in the past?
THE WITNESS:

No.

(R. 1313 Tr. 38:20-25, 39, 40:1-18.)
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court determined that the issue came
down to a "disjunctive" three-prong analysis. (R. 1313 Tr. 72:1-5.) The first prong was
whether there Crusher enjoyed an attorney-client relationship with Lilja. (R 1313 Tr.
72:5-11.) The second prong involved a determination of whether the current and prior
representations were substantially factually related under Rule 1.9(a) of the Rules of
Professional Responsibility, which is so, would require disqualification. (R. 1313 Tr.
72:11-17.) Finally, the third prong investigated "whether or not during this
representation of the Gilberts or their entities Mr. Lilja became privy to information
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which might be now detrimental to the Gilberts in this pending litigation." (R. 1313 Tr.
72:18-25, 73:1-15 (referring to Rule 1.9(b)).)
The trial court found the existence of an attorney-client relationship, (R. 1313 Tr.
72:5-11 (ruling "It appears to me clearly that there is - was at one point an attorney/client
relationship, and I don't think there's any doubt about that.").), but that there was no
substantial factual relationship between Lilja's representation and the current case
because "[i]t seems to me these are distinct cases." (R. 1313 Tr. 72:11-17.) As to the
final question, whether Rule 1.9(b) required the disqualification of Syndicate's trial
counsel, the trial court reasoned as follows:
Now - so the only remaining questions is whether or not during this
representation of the Gilberts or their entities Mr. Lilja became privy to
information which might be now detrimental to the Gilberts in this pending
litigation. I've asked you several times to identify what information you may
have that might be detrimental, and you've indicated you're not able to identify
that at this point. Mr. Lilja has indicated he can't think of anything that would be
detrimental.
So I think we're at a position where I have to say I'm not willing to grant
the motion to disqualify plaintiffs Counsel. If during the litigation any issues
arise which you think would involve information you had given to Mr. Lilja, you
ought to re-raise the issue at that point. Maybe at that point plaintiffs Counsel
would be disqualified, but I cannot see any basis for it now under the rule because
you haven't identified any information that he has that would be even relevant to
this case. I don't' think the fact that he helped you put contracts together helps
because in this case we're talking about an oral contract.
(R. 1313 Tr. 72:18-25, 73:1-11.) The trial court thus denied Crusher's motion without
prejudice, subject to "it being re-raised if and when an actual conflict of interest is
identified." (R. 1313 Tr. 73:12-15.) The trial court requested Syndicate's attorneys
prepare an order (R. 1313 Tr. 73:12-19); however, our review of the record reveals that
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the trial court never entered an order on this issue. (R. passim.) As such, the record is
devoid of written factual findings and conclusions of law relating to this issue.
C.

Activity During the Prosecution of the Lawsuit

After the trial court denied Crusher's motion to disqualify, the litigation proceeded
during which time Crusher filed a motion to amend its answer to include a counterclaim
against Syndicate and a third party complaint against BCM, David Silberstein, who is a
principal of Syndicate and another company controlled by Silberstein. (R. 187-277.) The
trial court granted the motion (R. 469-70) and Crusher thereafter filed its third party
complaint. (R. 383.) Syndicate's attorneys filed answers on behalf of Silberstein and his
connected entity but no answer was filed for or on behalf of BCM. (R 478-88.)
In the absence of an Answer from BCM, Crusher obtained a default judgment
against BCM in the amount prayed for in its third party complaint—$55,325.00. (R. 50809.) Notice of the default judgment was provided to Syndicate. (R. 510-11.) Syndicate
raised no objection to the entry of default or default judgment against BCM nor did it
ever move to set that default judgment aside. (R. passim; 1115.)
The matter proceeded thereafter to a bench trial on June 7 and 8, 2007, following which
the trial court ordered the parties to submit supplemental legal memoranda on several
issues, including the impact of the BCM default judgment on Syndicate. (R. 1312 Tr.
466:13-25.)4

4

Specifically, the trial court instructed:

[T]here's one issue that I really do need some — some guidance on, I
think that what I'm going to do is follow my initial plan and have counsel
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After reviewing the supplemental memoranda, the trial court granted judgment to
Syndicate, offsetting the award to compensate Crusher for the rental value lost to it
during the time that it held the Crushboss off of the market. (R. 1314.) Syndicate filed
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. (R. 1036-1042, 1044-45.) Crusher
filed its objections and the trial court, with one exception, signed the findings as drafted
on February 7, 2008. (R. 1019-1023, 1036-1042, 1044-45.) Crusher then filed a motion
to alter or amend the judgment (R. 1048), which resulted in the trial court announcing
that Syndicate was "not entitled to relitigate issues which it had an opportunity to litigate
as an indemnitor," but that the trial court was unwilling to place responsibility for the
BCM judgment on Syndicate. (R. 1315 Tr. 1289-91.) The trial court also ordered a
portion of the findings of fact and conclusions of law modified to properly reflect its
announced order, and Syndicate thus prepared Amended Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law. (R. 1292-1298, 1299.) Crusher now appeals.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Three errors warrant reversal of the trial court's decision in this matter.

submit proposed findings and conclusions and legal memoranda in support
of their respective positions.
Specifically, one of the issues that I'm very interested in is the
impact of the default judgment against the assignor of the claim, that is,
against Buttonwillow. I, frankly, do not know what to do with that, and so
I'd like some — some legal research with regard to what impact, if any, that
has on the other issues in this case.
(R. 1312 Tr. 466:13-25.)
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1.

First, the trial court erred in failing to apply the BCM judgment against

Syndicate. Prior to the initiation of this lawsuit, Syndicate entered into the Assignment
with BCM under which Syndicate agreed to assume all of BCM's liabilities related to this
matter, indemnify BCM against all losses or judgments, and to accept the delegation of
all responsibilities to defend BCM should Crusher seek relief from BCM. After initiating
the lawsuit in this matter, Syndicate unsuccessfully opposed Crusher's efforts to amend
its complaint and to file a third-party complaint against BCM. Syndicate was served with
a copy of Crusher's complaint and put on notice that Crusher had made specific claims
against BCM. And although it was aware of its obligation to respond for BCM,
Syndicate instead did nothing, resulting in default being entered against BCM, without
any objection by Syndicate. Syndicate contracted to act as BCM's surety in this matter,
and it had notice of Crusher's complaint against BCM and an opportunity to be heard.
Thus, due to the nature of Syndicate's relationship with BCM, the judgment entered
against BCM inures against Syndicate's interests and that trial court erred in failing to
apply the judgment against Syndicate.
2.

Second, the trial court erred in refusing to disqualify Syndicate's trial

counsel. For years, Crusher was represented by an attorney employed by the law firm
that represented Syndicate at trial. This representation extended to many different
corporate matters, all of which required that Syndicate's firm obtain a comprehensive
knowledge of Crusher's operations and business. It also included representation in
litigation matters, resulting in Syndicate's counsel possessing the wealth of knowledge
concerning Crusher's trial and litigation strategies. And although Crusher's relationship
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with counsel ended prior to the dispute with BCM and Syndicate arising, the fact of the
representation creates an irrebuttable presumption of possession of the confidential
information associated with its representation of Crusher. Consequently, Syndicate's
counsel was operating under an inherent and overwhelming conflict of interest that
should have resulted in his disqualification in this matter.
3.

Finally, the trial court erred in failing to enter findings of fact sufficient to

support its judgment that Crusher had been unjustly enriched by Crusher. A
determination of unjust enrichment requires the court to find that one party conferred a
benefit upon another, that the person receiving the benefit appreciated the benefit thus
conferred, and that the circumstances of the conference render the retention of the benefit
conferred inequitable. See Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1248 (Utah 1998) (discussing
the elements of unjust enrichment). However, to lie in unjust enrichment, the claim must
be between the conferrer and the conferee. See Smith, 2003 UT 57, f 34 (adopting the
view that unjust enrichment is a claim between the party that conferred the benefit and
the party that received the benefit). The trial court findings fail to identify who conferred
the purported benefit upon Crusher. This finding is essential to support the court's unjust
enrichment determination. Judgment was granted in favor of Syndicate. However, the
funds at issue were not conferred upon Crusher by Syndicate, but rather by Adventure
Partners, Ltd. In the absence of a finding that would link the benefit conferred upon
Crusher to Syndicate, Syndicate has no claim for unjust enrichment.
The trial court's errors in this matter caused substantial prejudice to Crusher, and
as a result, the trial court's judgment should be reversed, and this Court should 1) direct
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the trial court to apply Crusher's BCM judgment against Syndicate; 2) review its findings
of fact, and in the absence of sufficient findings or evidence to support the conclusions of
law, enter judgment in favor of Crusher; and 3) in the alternative, remand this case for a
new trial requiring the trial court to disqualify Syndicate's trial counsel.
ARGUMENT
I.

SYNDICATE, AS BCM'S SURETY AND INDEMNITOR, IS BOUND BY
CRUSHER'S JUDGMENT AGAINST BCM.
Where a surety and indemnitor has an obligation to indemnify and defend

another—its principal and indemnitee—and an action is brought against the principal and
indemnitee, a judgment entered against the principal is binding upon the surety if the
surety has notice of the action and an opportunity to participate in its defense. Here,
Syndicate was BCM's surety and was required to indemnify and defend BCM against
Crusher's third party complaint. Despite having notice and opportunity to mount such a
defense, it failed to do so, instead allowing default judgment to enter against BCM. As
more fully set forth below, the trial court erred in refusing to bind Syndicate to the default
judgment.
A.

Syndicate's Agreement with BCM was a Liability Contract Through
which Syndicate Assumed the Role of Surety for BCM in the Dispute
with Crusher

The Assignment signed by both Syndicate and BCM established Syndicate's
duties and obligations to BCM and it established Syndicate's role as surety for BCM in
the dispute with Crusher. '"When interpreting a contract, a court first looks to the
contract's four comers to determine the parties' intentions, which are controlling. If the
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language within the four corners of the contract is unambiguous . . . a court determines
the parties' intentions from the plain meaning of the contractual language as a matter of
law."" Fairbourn Commercial Inc. v. Am. Hous. Partners, Inc., 2004 UT 54, ^ 10, 94
P.3d 292 (quoting Bakowski v. Mountain States Steel Inc., 2002 UT 62,116, 52 P.3d
1179). "If a contract is integrated, parol evidence is admissible only to clarify ambiguous
terms: it is 'not admissible to vary or contradict the clear and unambiguous terms of the
contract.'" Tangren v. Tangren, 2008 UT 20, % 11, 182 P.3d 326 (quoting Hall v. Process
Instruments & Control Inc., 890 P.2d 1024, 1026 (Utah 1995)).
Here, Syndicate and BCM entered into a document entitled "Assignment of Cause
of Action" on March 23, 2005. See Addendum A. Through this agreement, BCM
assigned to Syndicate all of its interest, right and title in any claims involving Crusher.
See Assignment f 1 (attached hereto as Addendum A). BCM also delegated to Syndicate
"all of [BCM's] rights in, and duties, obligations and responsibilities of performance, if
any" pursuant to the claims involving Crusher, and in return Syndicate agreed to "assume
or perform those duties, obligations and responsibilities as if it had been the original party
to the applicable claims." Id Syndicate further agreed to "indemnify, hold harmless and
defend [BCM] against any and all claims, costs, debts, deficiencies, duties, expenses,
fees, injuries, liabilities, losses, obligations, penalties, recoveries, or responsibilities" that
may arise out of the dispute with Crusher and Syndicate's prosecution of any claims. Id
Tf 2. Finally, the parties agreed that the Assignment constituted the entire agreement
between them and that the agreement was integrated and complete. Id ^[8. These terms
are clear, and subject to only one reasonable interpretation: Syndicate entered into a
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liability contract with BCM, through which it contracted to become BCM's surety in the
dispute with Crusher.
Under California law,5 a surety is defined to '"include everyone who is bound on
an obligation, which as between himself and another person who is also bound to the
obligee for the same performance, the latter should discharge.'" Everts v. Matteson, 132
P.2d 476, 482 (Cal. 1942) (citation omitted). More recently, California has defined a
surety as c"one who promises to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another.'"
Morgan Creek Residential v. Kemp, 153 Cal. App. 4th 675, 685 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007)
(quoting Civil Code § 2787).6 Applying this definition to the language of Syndicate's
agreement with BCM, there should be no question that Syndicate assumed the position of
not only BCM indemnitor, but also of its surety. Specifically, Syndicate agreed to
"assume and perform" all of BCM's "duties, obligations and responsibilities" related to
the dispute with Crusher as if Syndicate was "the original party to the applicable claims."
Assignment f 1. This language signals that Syndicate was stepping into BCM's shoes,
assuming BCM's role in the dispute with Crusher, and accepting all the risks associated
with the dispute. However, Syndicate's obligations to BCM went much further.
Syndicate also agreed to "indemnify, hold harmless and defend [BCM] against any and

5

The Assignment provides that it should be interpreted under the laws of the State
of California. See Assignment^ 10.
6

Even under Utah law there is no practical difference between a surety bond and a
contract for indemnification. Both are contracts under which the indemnitor or surety
promises to answer for the debts or defaults or another. See Lister v. Great Am. Ins. Co.,
484 P.2d 156, 159 (Utah 1971) (Ellett, J., concurring) ("[a] contract of surety . . . is one
whereby the surety promises to answer for a debt, default or miscarriage of another").
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all claims, costs, debts, deficiencies, duties, expenses, fees, injuries, liabilities, losses,
obligations, penalties, recoveries, or responsibilities" that could arise and attach to BCM
as a result of the dispute with Crusher. Id ^ 2. In other words, in entering into the
Assignment with BCM, Syndicate obtained a sword to wield against Crusher—BCM's
claims. But it also committed to raise a shield to protect BCM against any claims
Crusher might bring against BCM. Having thus assumed all of the risks and
responsibilities that otherwise inured to BCM pursuant to the dispute with Crusher,
Syndicate promised to answer for BCM's debts and defaults associated with the dispute
with Crusher, which places Syndicate squarely in the position of BCM's surety under
California law.
B.

The Trial Court Erred in Refusing to Apply the BCM Judgment
Against Crusher

Syndicate contracted with BCM to become its indemnitor, liability umbrella, and
surety in the dispute with Crusher. Under California law, '"[w]hether one is a surety . . .
depends not on his relation to the creditor but on his relation to the principal debtor.
Consequently, an agreement for sufficient consideration between principal and surety, by
which the latter assumes [responsibility for] the debt, transposes the surety into a
principal and the principal into a surety.'" Everts, 132 P.2d at 482 (citation omitted).
"[T]he general rule that has emerged is that a surety is bound by any judgment against its
principal, default or otherwise, when the surety had full knowledge of the action against
the principal and an opportunity to defend." Drill South Inc. v. Int'l Fid. Ins. Co., 234
F.3d 1232, 1235 (11th Cir. 2000). Thus, "[t]he law requires only that the surety have
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notice and an opportunity to defend before it is bound by the judgment agamst the
principal." Id. at 1337. See also United States v. B.E.N. Constr., Inc., No. 051219-MLB,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6321, *14-19 (D. Kan. Jan. 26, 2007) (holding that surety is
bound by arbitration results when it has actual notice and an opportunity to be defend);
McAlpine v. Zangara Dodge, Inc., 183 P.3d 975, 980-81 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008) (holding
that a "surety is bound by default judgment against the principal" so long as it is clear
that the surety had notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to defend); Am. Safety
Cas. Ins. Co. v. C.G. Mitchell Constr., Inc., 601 S.E.2d 633, 350-51 (Va. 2004) (holding
that a surety is bound by a judgment entered against its principal so long as the surety had
notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard); accord Drill South, Inc., 234
F.3d at 13 n.8 (highlighting cases that have held sureties bound by judgment entered
against principals when the sureties had been provided notice of the proceedings and an
opportunity to defend).
In this matter, Syndicate placed itself in the position of BCM's surety when it
entered into the global Assignment agreement with BCM, in which Syndicate assumed
the role of surety for BCM. Syndicate then initiated the lawsuit by filing its complaint
against Crusher, which prompted Crusher to respond with not only a counterclaim against
Syndicate, but also with a third-party complaint against BCM, among others. Syndicate
was served with a copy of the third-party complaint, as was Syndicate's principal, soon
after it was filed. And, although under the plain language of the Assignment Syndicate
had the right, obligation, and responsibility to defend BCM against Crusher's complaint,
Syndicate chose to shirk this responsibility and ignore the opportunity to present a
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defense for BCM. Soon after the third party complaint was filed and served, each of the
other named third-party defendants (represented by Syndicate's attorneys) answered the
same, including Syndicate's principal, David Silberstein. But Syndicate, for reasons as
yet unknown, left BCM exposed, failing to answer the third party complaint.
Subsequently, when Crusher moved for the entry of default against BCM, Syndicate
again remained silent. It posed no objection to the default and offered no defense to the
absence of BCM's answer to the complaint. Syndicate repeated this performance when
Crusher filed its default judgment against BCM for the amount sought through Crusher's
complaint, and made no effort following the entry of that judgment to have it set aside or
amended. Instead, Syndicate simply allowed the judgment to be entered without
objection.
The facts of Drill South, Inc. illuminate Syndicate's error. In Drill South, Inc.,
Enviro-Group, Inc., a construction company, entered into a contract for which
International Fidelity Insurance Co. agreed to act as surety. See id., at 1234. EnviroGroup Inc., defaulted on the contract and was in turn sued for unpaid invoices by its
subcontractors. See id. For various reasons, International Fidelity Insurance, Co. was
also named in the various suits. See id. One of the plaintiffs moved for the entry of
default against Enviro-Group, and in response, International Fidelity Group Co. "stated
that it took no position on a default against its principal.. . provided that the default
judgment was not deemed binding on International Fidelity." Id, Neither Drill South nor
Enviro-Group responded to International Fidelity Group, and default was entered against
Enviro-Group. See id. Soon thereafter, the trial court determined that because
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International Fidelity Insurance Group assumed the role of Enviro-Group's surety, it was
"bound by the default judgment." Id. at 1235. On appeal, International Fidelity
Insurance Group argued, among other claims, that the default judgment should not have
been binding against it because default judgments entered against a principle "are not
binding on a co-defendant surety actively defending in the same action." Id. In response,
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals informed International Fidelity Insurance Group
that "the general rule that has emerged is that a surety is bound by any judgment against
its principal, default or otherwise, when the surety has full knowledge of the action
against the principal and the opportunity to defend." Id. at 1235. Then, after reviewing
the circumstances of the case, the court determined
[t]he record is replete with instances in which the district court
afforded International Fidelity both notice and opportunity to step
in and defend the merits of Drill South's claims against EnviroGroup and the extent of its liability. It is also clear to this Court
that International Fidelity had the legal right to step in and defend
Enviro-Group against the default judgment at every stage of the
proceedings pursuant to its Agreement of Indemnity with EnvoriGroup.
Id. Under those circumstances, the court concluded that "International Fidelity should
not be permitted to stand back and allow judgment to be taken setting the amount of
recovery against its principal without similarly being bound by the judgment." Id.
Syndicate's situation shares many of the characteristics of International Fidelity
Insurance Group's situation. First, Syndicate volunteered to assume the role as BCM's
surety. Second, after Syndicate filed suit against Crusher, Crusher filed a counterclaim
against Syndicate and the third party complaint against BCM and Crusher's principal, in
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which Crusher informed the court that Syndicate had assumed the role of BCM's surety.
And although Syndicate unsuccessfully opposed Crusher's request for leave to file its
complaint and counterclaim, it then simply ignored Crusher's complaint against BCM.
Thereafter, it took no position when Crusher sought the entry of default against BCM,
and it stood on the sidelines when Crusher submitted the default judgment against BCM,
and not only failed to oppose the entry of the judgment, it never made any effort to have
the judgment altered, amended, or set aside. Yet, the record makes clear that Syndicate
was aware that Crusher intended to file its third party complaint; that the principal of
Syndicate was named in Crusher's third party complaint; that Syndicate was served with
the third party complaint; and that Syndicate had ample opportunity to mount a defense
for BCM by filing an answer. The record also makes clear that the trial court rejected
Crusher's first attempt to have default entered against BCM, on January 4, 2007, and that
only upon Crusher's second application was default entered on January 10, 2007. This
gap afforded Syndicate ample opportunity, unrealized, to respond and inject a defense for
BCM. Finally, by at least January 16, 2007, Syndicate received notice of the entry of
judgment against BCM, and a copy of the actual judgment, yet it continued to take no
position concerning BCM's defense, and offered no defense for BCM. It simply stood
back and allowed a judgment to be taken setting the amount of recovery against its
principal, BCM
Consequently, because Syndicate had notice of Crusher's third party complaint
against Syndicate's principal, BCM, and a full opportunity, if not absolute obligation, to
defend BCM's interests, Syndicate is bound by the default judgment against BCM and
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the trial court erred in rejecting Crusher's request to bind Syndicate by the BCM
Judgment.
IL

LILJA'S PRIOR REPRESENTATION OF CRUSHER REQUIRED THE
COURT TO DISQUALIFY HIS LAW FIRM AND THE TRIAL COURT'S
FAILURE TO DO SO TAINTED THE LAWSUIT.
Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9 provides:
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter:
(a) Represent another person in the same or a substantially factually related matter
in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former
client unless the former client unless the former client consents after consultation;
or
(b) Use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the
former client except as Rule 1.6 would permit with respect to a client or when the
information has become generally known.

7

To the extent that Syndicate may attempt to argue that it has a latent or patent
right to argue the merits of the judgment in a collateral action, such a position would be
without adequate support. '"As a general rule, a "default judgment establishes, as a
matter of law, that defendants [are] liable to plaintiff as to each cause of action alleged in
the complaint.'"" Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 965 (Utah Ct. App.
1989) (citations omitted). "Where it appears that the judgment against a defendant was
obtained in a suit of which the surety had full knowledge, and which it had full
opportunity to defend, the judgment therein is not only evidence, but conclusive
evidence, against every defense except fraud and collusion in obtaining it." Lake County
v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 75 F.2d 6, 8 (5th Cir. 1935); see also Goldman, Antonetti,
Ferraiuoll Axtmaver & Hertell v. Medfit Int'l Inc. 982 F.2d 686, 693 (1 st Cur. 1993)
(holding that a defendant cannot ignore the "maxim that an entry of a default against a
defendant establishes the defendant's liability").
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Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.9(a), (b). These prohibitions are imputed to the law firm in
which the lawyer is associated. See Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.10(a) ("While lawyers are
associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of
them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.7 or 1.9, unless the
prohibition is based on a personal interest of the prohibited lawyer and does not present a
significant risk of materially limiting the representation of the client by the remaining
lawyers in the firm.").
Thus, if Lilja could not represent Syndicate in this action against Crusher, that
prohibition extends to Van Cott, because Syndicate's employment of Van Cott was
necessarily an employment of Lilja as well. See Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding,
2001 UT 107, f 82, 37 P.3d 1130 ("'It is axiomatic that the employment of a law firm is
the employment of all members of that firm unless there is a special understanding
otherwise.'" (quoting Knight v. Guzman, 684 N.E.2d 152 (111. App. 1997)). As set forth
more fully below, Rules 1.9 and 1.10 prohibited Van Cott's representation of Syndicate
in this action.

The term "factually" in Utah's Rule 1.9(a) was unique to Utah's version of the
rule. See Houghton v. Utah Dep't of Health, 962 P.2d 58, 62 & n.l (Utah 1998). In
November 2005, however, Rule 1.9 was amended to, among other things, delete the term
"factually" in reference to "substantially factually related matter." Utah R. Prof. Conduct
1.9(a) (effective Nov. 1, 2005). The amendments occurred several months after the trial
court's decision on the motion to disqualify in this case, and therefore we apply and refer
to the version of Rule 1.9 in effect at the time of the trial court's decision.
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A.

Lilja's Prior Representation And The Present Suit Involve A
Substantially Factually Related Matter,
1.

Lilja represented Crusher on its implementation of the business
practices that his law firm attacked in this litigation.

There is no single definition of what constitutes a "substantially factually related
matter" under Rule 1.9(a). Cf. Cheves v. Williams, 1999 UT 86, |59, 993 P.2d 191. As
one scholar has observed, the standard "has sometimes proved much easier to recite than
to describe accurately or to apply confidently." Charles W. Wolfram, Former-Client
Conflicts, 10 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 677, 680 (1997). Utah's standard has been described
in various ways. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that it requires a "distinct, factual
link between the former and present representations." Cheves, 1999 UT 86 at ^[59. The
Court has also approved of various federal court descriptions of the standard. In SLC
Limited V v. Bradford Group West, Inc., 999 F.2d 464 (10th Cir. 1993), the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals stated that it focuses on "the factual nexus between the prior and
current representations rather than a narrower identity of legal issues." Id at 467 (quoted
with approval in Cheves, 1999 UT 86 at f 59). In Poly Software International, Inc. v. Yu
Su, 880 F. Supp. 1487 (D. Utah 1995), the court described the proper review as including
"aspects of past controversies which are similar, but not necessarily identical, to those
encompassed within a present dispute. So long as there are substantial factual threads
connecting the two matters, the criteria of Rule 1.9 are met." Id at 1492 (cited with
approval in Cheves, 1999 UT 86 at f 59).
While there are various descriptions of what the standard is, there is a clear
description of what it is not. It is not a bright line rule that requires exact similarity
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between the two matters at issue. See SLC Ltd. V, 999 F.2d at 467 ("Substantial factual
relation should not be read to require attorneys to have worked on exactly the same
matter for both sides of the dispute before they are disqualified."). Yet, a bright line was
exactly what the trial court was searching for as evidenced by its questing of Mr. Gilbert
on whether there was any discussion with Lilja about this particular case. The fact that
Lilja did not represent Crusher on the specific transaction with Syndicate is not
determinative. So long as there is a factual nexus or common factual thread,
disqualification is required. See Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.9 (utilizing the mandatory
"shall not" in reference to subsequent representation). When the claims in the current
case are measured against Lilja's prior representation, the factual nexus becomes
apparent.
Lilja's representation of Crusher was not an isolated transaction or litigation
matter. He represented Crusher as its outside general counsel over the course of an
approximately ten year period—which included representation of the company during its
infancy. The undisputed evidence was that Crusher developed its business practices on
Lilja's watch and with his input and advice. Lilja advised Crusher concerning how to
structure rentals and sales, contracts, obtaining deposits, issues related to insurance, and
advice on what measures to take to avoid litigation. This advice is still utilized today.
Now Syndicate, represented by Lilja's firm, is challenging the very business
practices that Crusher implemented with Lilja's advice. Syndicate sued Crusher over a
specific transaction involving the manner in which Crusher accepted the deposit for the
rental of a crusher and equipment, including causes of action for breach of contract,
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unjust enrichment, constructive trust, and fraud over the rental of the equipment and the
retention of the deposit. These claims, by their very nature, require an exploration into
Crusher's business practices in the renting of equipment and rationale behind retention of
the deposit, all of which are inextricably intertwined with advice received from Lilja.
This became apparent when the matter went to trial and several exhibits were
introduced that can be directly tied to Lilja's representation. These included Crusher's
rental contracts as well as its terms and conditions for rental. (R. Trial Exs. 7, 12, 15, 47,
48.) Evidence was introduced which pointed to Crusher's requirement that Syndicate
provide insurance on the equipment it was renting from Crusher before Crusher would
provide the equipment at issue. (R. Trial Ex. 10.)
Van Cott could not represent Syndicate in challenging Crusher's actions in this
case without necessarily challenging the practices that Lilja was instrumental in
developing as Crusher's attorney over the course of almost ten years. Rule 1.9(a)
prohibits lawyers, and by operation of Rule 1.10(a), their law firms, from attacking their
own work. As explained by Professor Wolfram, "we don't want the builders of legal
edifices to be in a position later to lay effective siege to their own work by exploiting
weak spots planted within it, whether intentionally or artlessly. The reason . . . is simple
concern with the vagaries of human nature—the instinct to disloyalty—in a context in
which the threat may be not inconsiderable that the unfortunate consequences of those
vagaries will be visited on the former client." Wolfram, at 697-98. The Utah Supreme
Court has recognized as much, stating that "Rule 1.9 was intended to prevent the betrayal
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of a professional trust arising out of the lawyer-client relationship." Houghton v. Dep't
of Health, 962 P.2d 58, 61 (Utah 1998).
To be sure, a law firm should not be disqualified because a lawyer within that firm
once provided general business advice to the former client. See, e.g., Cheves, 1999 UT
86 at ^[60; Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.9 cmt. Crusher does not seek an expansion of the rule
to provide otherwise. The rule itself contemplates that each matter depends upon its
particular facts and the degree of the lawyer's involvement with the former client. See
Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.9 cmt. And in considering disqualification, courts should factor
into the equation the level of appearance of impropriety that will result from allowing the
representation. See Marguilies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195, 1205 (Utah 1985)
(disqualifying law firm based on "serious appearance of impropriety [] coupled with
violations of the Code of Professional Conduct") (decided under prior rules). It is, after
all, the "integrity of the court system as well as the integrity of the profession" that drives
disqualification under our ethical rules. Id.
Where, as here, a lawyer's representation of the former client "was so prolonged
and extended to so many issues that the lawyer fairly can be viewed as knowing the client
inside and out[,]" courts have not hesitated to disqualify attorneys from representing
adversaries of their former clients. Wolfram, at 725-26 n.197 (collecting cases which
hold same).
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Lilja's representation falls within this category and, in light of his lengthy
representation, gives a substantial appearance of impropriety.9 Lilja would have
knowledge of Crusher's "strategies and operations" as a result of his prior representation,
therefore, it is sufficient to create a conflict under Rule 1.9(a) because those particular
strategies and operations relate to matter in the current litigation. SLC Ltd. V, 999 F.2d
at 467. See also City of El Paso v. Soule, 6 F. Supp. 2d 616, 624 (W.D. Tex. 1998)
(disqualifying law firm, reasoning "[i]t would be patently unfair to allow the same lawyer
to represent interests adverse to a former client regarding the same business affairs,
especially in light of the theories for recovery in, and the nature of, the underlying suit.").
As stated by one court, "[i]n determining whether to disqualify counsel for conflict of
interest, the trial court is not to weigh the circumstances cwith hair-splitting nicety' but, in
the proper exercise of its supervisory power over the members of the bar and with a view
of preventing 'the appearance of impropriety,' it is to resolve all doubts in favor of
disqualification." United States v. Clarkson, 567 F.2d 270, 273 (4th Cir. 1977).
In sum, Lilja's prior representation and the present suit involve a substantially
factually related matter. As a result, the trial court erred in not disqualifying Van Cott.

9

This is not, for example, a situation where the scope of the representation was
limited and could be separated from the current representation. See, e.g., Roderick v.
Ricks, 2002 UT 84,1H[52"53> 5 4 p - 3 d 1 1 1 9 (trial court's findings indicated limited scope
of prior representation which necessarily could have limited the amount of confidential
information obtained from former client).
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2.

A substantial relationship creates an irrebuttable presumption that
confidential information was disclosed to the attorney.

We expect Syndicate to argue, as it did below, that the only things Lilja could
remember handling for Crusher or the Gilberts were the litigation matters. Lilja could
not recall providing any specific advice to Crusher concerning the implementation of its
business practices. However, Lilja's recollection of what advice he did or did not give to
Crusher is not determinative. See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 659
F.2d 1341, 1347 (5th Cir. 1981) (attorney cannot defeat disqualification by stating he
does not recall any disclosure of confidential information or that, in fact, no such
information was disclosed). Nor is Lilja's testimony that he reviewed the Complaint in
this action and could not recall giving Crusher any advice that would be substantially
factually related to the litigation. See id.
Once a substantial relationship is found, there is a presumption that the lawyer
acquired confidential information from the former client that requires the lawyer's
disqualification. See Houghton, 962 P.2d at 62. See also Smith v. Whatcott 757 F.2d
1098, 1100 (10th Cir. 1985) (holding once a substantial relationship is established, "a
presumption arises that a client has indeed revealed facts to the attorney that require his
disqualification.").
This presumption is irrebuttable. See Smith v. Whatcott, 757 F.2d at 1100 (stating
"[t]he majority of circuits that have considered the issue have held this presumption to be
irrebuttable."); Koch v. Koch Indus., 798 F. Supp. 1525, 1536 (D. Kan. 1992) (where a
substantial relationship is found, "an irrebuttable presumption arises that the former client
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revealed facts requiring the attorney's disqualification."); Analytica, Inc. v. NPD
Research, Inc., 708 F.2d 1263, 1266 (7th Cir. 1983) (stating "if the lawyer could have
obtained confidential information in the first representation that would have been relevant
in the second" the lawyer should be disqualified; and reasoning it is "irrelevant whether
he actually obtained such information and used it against his former client").
This "presumption is intended to protect client confidentiality as well as to avoid
any appearance of impropriety." Smith v. Whatcott 757 F.2d at 1100. Further, the
"presumption avoids compelling the former client to prove the very things that he seeks
to keep confidential." In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Lit., 659 F.2d atl347. As
explained by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, if the attorney could rebut the
presumption by providing "that he did not recall any disclosure of confidential
information, or that no confidential information was in fact disclosed," it could "defeat
the purpose of keeping the client's secrets confidential." Id. "The confidences would be
disclosed during the course of rebutting the presumption by the attorney, or if the
presumption was considered rebutted, the client might again be put into the anomalous
position of having to show what confidences he entrusted to his attorney in order to
prevent those confidences from being revealed." Id
Despite Lilja's apparent candor in his testimony, he should not have been placed
in the awkward position of having to violate a confidence of a former client in order that
his law firm could represent a new one. The same is true of Crusher. The trial court was
essentially requiring Crusher to reveal, by chapter and verse, the specific information that
Lilja provided. It was only going to find a conflict if the attorney or the former client was
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able to reveal the very information that the former client was seeking to protect. That is
taking it too far. See State ex rel. Keenan v. Hatcher, 557 S.E.2d 361, 368 (W. Va. 2001)
(reasoning it is not appropriate for the court to inquire into whether actual confidences
were disclosed).
Instead, the inquiry should be an abstract one into whether "confidential
information derived from the representation of the former client might possibly have a
bearing upon the present adverse matter." Id This simply involves a "realistic appraisal
of the possibility that confidences had been disclosed in the one matter which will be
harmful to the client in the other . . . . It is not appropriate for the court to inquire into
whether actual confidences were disclosed." IcL (quoting Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1978)).
Under this inquiry, the trial court had sufficient facts on which it should have
concluded that that Lilja possessed confidences that might be harmful to Crusher in this
litigation, and thus should have resulted in Van Cott's disqualification.
B.

The Length and Scope of Lilja's Prior Representation Gave Him
Crusher's "Playbook," Which Should Have Resulted In
Disqualification Under Rule 1.9(b).

Even if this Court determines that the prior and current representations do not
involve a substantially factually related matter, disqualification is warranted under Rule
1.9(b) because Lilja obtained confidential information from Crusher that his firm may use
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to Crusher's disadvantage. See Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.9(b); Spratley v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.. 2003 UT 39, f 14, 78 P.3d 603.10
Despite the fact that Rule 1.9(b) presents a different test than 1.9(a), our research
has revealed little case law in Utah that provides useful guidance on Rule 1.9(b). For
example, Spratley references Rule 1.9(b) but focuses on the exceptions found in Rule
1.6(b) as the case concerned a suit by attorneys against their former client concerning
allegations that the former client requested them to engage in unethical and unlawful
practices. See 2003 UT 39 atffi[2-3,14-22. In Houghton, the Utah Supreme Court
turned away a challenge under Rule 1.9(b) because the party seeking disqualification, the
State of Utah, could not articulate any unfair advantage in the other side being
represented by attorneys who formerly represented the State on a different matter. See
962P.2dat63.
In this case, the trial court rejected disqualification under Rule 1.9(b) because
Crusher was not able to identify for the trial court any information that Lilja became
privy to that might now be detrimental to Crusher in this case. To be sure, the trial
court's finding is based upon and supported by the testimony of Mr. Gilbert in which he
was not able to identify any discussions with Lilja about this particular case with
Syndicate. It was also based upon Lilja's testimony that he had reviewed the Complaint
and did not believe he had any information concerning the case with Syndicate. And,
10

As a threshold matter, the trial court was correct in ruling that 1.9(a) and 1.9(b)
operate independent of one another by virtue of the Rule containing the disjunctive "or,"
as opposed to the conjunctive "and." [R. 1313 Tr. 72:1-5.] See also Calhoun v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2004 UT 56, ^20, 96 P.3d 916 (disjunctive "or" indicates an
alternative whereas conjunctive "and" requires a party to meet both requirements).
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both testified that the last time they spoke was several years before this lawsuit was filed.
Thus, on a basic level, there is logic to the trial court's decision. But the trial court's
focus was too narrow. There is nothing in Rule 1.9(b) that requires or even suggests that
the two matters have to be related. Rather, the rule is clear that so long the confidential
information was disclosed and could be detrimental, disqualification is required. See
Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.9(b).
When viewed in this light, Mr. Gilbert did identify for the trial court the
confidential information Crusher was seeking to protect. Given the number of years that
Lilja represented Crusher, as well as the Gilberts and related entities, Lilja had
knowledge of, not only Crusher's business operations and strategy, but also its litigation
and trial strategy. This Court has previously held that in certain circumstances trial
strategy may constitute confidential information for purposes of disqualification. See
Cade v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 956 P.2d 1073, 1081 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). In fact, the
definition of confidential information is broad, encompassing information that a client
may have communicated to her attorney, and vice versa, with an expectation that it would
not be disclosed to third persons. See Utah R. Evid. 504(a)(6); Utah R. Prof. Conduct
1.6(a) (prohibiting lawyers from revealing "information relating to the representation of a
client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in
order to carry out the representation or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b).").
Certainly, a lawyer who, as a result of a long-standing attorney-client relationship,
has learned the former client's settlement strategy and philosophy, its tactics in litigation
and negotiation, and how the client conducts its business and deals with the stress of
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litigation would be at a distinct advantage should he change sides and then utilize all he
has learned about the former client to the former client's disadvantage. Under these
circumstances it can be said that by virtue of the attorney-client relationship, the attorney
came into possession of the former client's "playbook." Wolfram, at 723-24. Were this a
football contest it would be tantamount to knowing exactly when your adversary will go
for it on fourth down, will punt, or will simply crumble under the pressure. On the field,
that is strategy. In the legal profession it is a conflict. See Hurley v. Hurley, 923 A.2d
908, 912 (Me. 2007) (affirming disqualification where it can be inferred that attorney
learned confidential information about how former client handled stress of litigation,
ability to accept compromise, as well as her health and income history).
Though not terming it as such, in Houghton, the State unsuccessfully advanced a
form of the playbook argument. There, the attorneys under question had previously
represented the State in personal injury actions brought by Medicaid recipients against
third persons. See Houghton, 962 P.2d at 59. The State conceded that in the former
representation its consultations with the attorneys was limited to discussion about the
amount the Medicaid liens and the conditions under which the State would waive or
reduce its lien if recovery was obtained. See id. at 60. In the subsequent case, however,
the attorneys represented the plaintiffs against the State on a single cause of action
challenging whether a statute violated federal Medicaid law. See id. at 59-60. The State
sought disqualification, arguing, inter alia, that under Rule 1.9(b) it was placed at a
disadvantage and that the attorneys were "privy to the State's 'strategy' in pursuing
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Medicaid reimbursement.'" Id at 63. In other words, the State was arguing that the
attorneys had its playbook.
The Utah Supreme Court did not reject the theory advanced by the State; it
rejected the argument because the litigation involved no confidential information
received in the prior representation and the State did not disclose any real "strategy" in
the prior cases that would have any impact on the issues in the current litigation. See id.
The attack involved the statute at issue, which was purely a legal argument. See id.
As stated above, in Cade this Court recognized that litigation strategy constitutes
confidential information worthy of protection. See Cade, 956 P.2d at 1081. It held that
an attorney should be disqualified if the attorney came into possession of confidential
information related to trial strategy that was disclosed by the former client and that the
disclosure would taint the proceedings. See id. There, this Court upheld the trial court's
denial of a motion to disqualify because it involved an arbitration award that was made
prior to any disclosures taking place, and the procedural status of the case made remote
any damage that might result from any alleged disclosures made after the fact. See id.
In Spratley, the party seeking disqualification relied on Cade in support of its
argument for disqualification. See Spratley, 2003 UT 39 at ^28. The Utah Supreme
Court held that, under the facts in Spratley, the test was inapplicable; however, it stated
"[w]e do not disapprove of the test outline in Cade, only its application to this case." Id.
atf28.
Crusher's predicament in the instant case stands in stark contrast to the State's in
Houghton and the party seeking disqualification in Cade. In this case there is a long
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relationship between Crusher and its former counsel, Lilja. The problem is further
compounded because of Lilja's representation of one of Crusher's officers (Steve
Gilbert), its majority shareholder (Gilbert Development), its in-house and trial counsel in
this litigation (Cyndi Gilbert), and other entities controlled by Mr. Gilbert. In fact, Mr.
Gilbert testified that not only did Lilja advise Crusher on the structure of rentals and it
business, he identified Crusher's litigation strategy as being a concern, because Lilja
would have knowledge of how Crusher would conduct its litigation based on his prior
representation of Crusher, Mr. Gilbert, and its attorney, Ms. Gilbert.
While the trial court was seeking to decide the issue using a bright line, there is no
case that establishes such a rule. Rather, as here, there are simply cases in which a
prolonged representation by an attorney should require disqualification. Further, the fact
that Lilja could not remember much of anything at the hearing, that is not determinative.
We have found no authority to suggest an attorney's memory should decide the issue.
Memories have a tendency to be refreshed, which is exactly what occurred in this case
with Lilja as he was testifying in the hearing as to one of the litigation matters. [R. 1313
Tr. 45:5-24 (testifying "I was sitting here today and it occurred to me what had happened
that split those two cases apart[.]").]
Quite simply, Crusher should not have to defend itself against an adversary
wondering the entire time whether its former attorney, in possession of its playbook (a
playbook that the former attorney helped create), containing the wealth of knowledge
about its business and litigation strategies, could at any time utilize that information to
Crusher's disadvantage. The rules are in place "to prevent the possibility that an attorney
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might use information given in confidence by a former client in a later action against that
client. Allowing later adverse representation when the former client's disclosures might
be used against him could inhibit the free exchange of information between attorney and
client which our legal system presupposes." Marguilies, 696 P.2d at 1202.
In sum, the length and scope of Lilja's prior representation gave him Crusher's
"playbook," which should have resulted in disqualification under Rule 1.9(b).
C.

Allowing Lilja's Law Firm to Represent Crusher's Adversary Tainted
the Lawsuit

In Cheves, the Utah Supreme Court stated that in "reviewing a denial of a motion
to disqualify after trial has been completed, we must determine whether the alleged
misconduct actually 'tainted the lawsuit.'" 1999 UT 86 at ^[61 (quoting Poly Software,
880 F. Supp. at 1495). To make that determination the court focused on whether the
former client was prejudiced in some way as a result of the representation. See id. We
expect Syndicate may advance the argument that Crusher's burden here is to show actual
prejudice. However, there is nothing in Cheves that suggests that there must be actual
prejudice to warrant reversal. Rather, the standard is whether the representation "tainted
the lawsuit." And, quoting Poly Software, the court provided a non-exclusive list of
"proposed" factors to look at in making this determination. Id. These included the
"cegregiousness of the violation, degree of prejudice resulting from the violation, extent
of diminution of effectiveness of counsel, and equitable considerations such as hardship
in obtaining new counsel [and] unfair advantage in the present litigation.'" Id (quoting
Poly Software, 880 F. Supp. at 1495 n.2).
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As stated, in Cheves, the court's focus was on actual prejudice. See id. There, the
court was able to zero in on the evidence introduced at trial to determine that, even if the
evidence allegedly obtained by the attorney's prior representation was used ait trial, "there
was sufficient other evidence in the record to support the jury's fmdings[.]" Id. at TJ62.
Further, in Cheves, the attorney and former client did not have a long history. Rather, the
only evidence of the prior representation was a single invoice for legal fees and a check
for payment of those fees. See id. at ^58. That is not the case here.
Here, again, Lilja's representation was a lengthy one. It covered an approximately
ten year period of both corporate and litigation representation. The trial court's refusal to
disqualify Van Cott allowed Crusher's adversary an unchecked access to Lilja. In fact, in
refusing to disqualify Lilja the trial court did not impose any screening restrictions on
Lilja. There is no way for Crusher to know whether Syndicate benefited from having
Lilja in its camp. He could have, for example, strategized with Syndicate's trial counsel
for the purpose of preparing to examine witnesses at trial, such as Mr. Gazlay. He could
have provided information concerning Crusher's practice of retaining deposits. He could
have communicated the manner in which Crusher and its trial counsel, Ms. Gilbert,
would make decisions on whether to settle or take the case to trial.
The problem is that the only way for Crusher to know whether this was going on is
if it would have engaged in a second litigation, i.e., discovery calculated to determine
what discussions were taking place behind closed doors. No doubt Syndicate's answer
would have been to invoke the attorney-client or work product privileges against such
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disclosure. It is difficult to see how this lawsuit was not tainted through Van Cott's and
Lilja's representation of Syndicate.
The list of non-exclusive factors articulated by the Supreme Court in Cheves
should certainly encompass a situation like the instant one. After all, the touchstone of
disqualification is to avoid the appearance of impropriety. See Marguilies, 696 P.2d at
1205. See also Prisco v. Westgate Enter., Inc., 799 F. Supp. 266, 271 (D. Conn. 1992)
(quoting Koch, 798 F. Supp. at 1525) ("Rule 1.9 is not limited to situations where a
former client would be harmed by the divulgence of confidential information. The rule
'imposes an ethical obligation irrespective of harm.5").
Under these circumstances, to require a showing of actual prejudice after the fact
is tantamount to requiring Crusher to sew the wind. If this Court sanctions the result it
would undermine the purpose of the rule and require a former client to engage in
discovery to determine what went on behind closed doors leaving it to the trial court to
deal with the inevitable discovery and privilege disputes that would follow.
As stated by one court,
Rule 1.9 is very concise and unambiguous. A determination of violation is
not based upon prejudice to any party, upon the efforts of the attorney to avoid
unethical representation, upon the timely action of the State Bar, or upon a simple
appearance of impropriety. Instead, the rule unequivocally states that if the two
representations involve the same or substantially related matter and the interests of
the two clients are materially adverse, an ethical violation will occur, absent
former client consent following consultation.
State ex rel. Keenan v. Hatcher, 557 S.E.2d 361, 367 (W. Va. 2001).
This Court should resolve this case under time honored principles that "'It is the
glory of the legal profession that its fidelity to its clients can be depended upon; that a
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man may safely go to a lawyer and converse with him upon his rights in litigation with
absolute assurance that that lawyer's tongue is tied from ever discussing it.'" Gray v.
State, 469 So. 2d 1252, 1255 (Miss. 1985) (quoting People v. Gerold, 107 N.E. 165, 175
(111. 1914)). This lawsuit was tainted by the fact that Crusher had no assurance. The trial
court erred in failing to disqualify Van Cott.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS ARE INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
THE CONCLUSION THAT SYNDICATE UNJUSTLY ENRICHED
SYNDICATE
The trial court's findings of fact are insufficient to the support its ultimate

conclusion that Crusher was unjustly enriched by Syndicate. A trial court has the
responsibility to make findings of fact that support its conclusions of law, and this
requirement is "mandatory and may not be waived." Romrell v. Zions First Nat. Bank,
N.A., 611 P.2d 392, 394 (Utah 1980). "Rational decision making by the trial court
requires that the court address and resolve all pertinent subordinate and ultimate factual
issues which must be resolved on the basis of the evidence presented and the applicable
rules of law." Id '"Failure of the trial court to make findings on all material issues is
reversible error unless the facts in the record are "clear, uncontroverted, and capable of
supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment."'" State v. Real Prop, at 633 East 640
North, Orem, Utah, 942 P.2d 925, 931 (Utah 1997) (quoting Butler, Crockett & Walsh
Dev. Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co.,, 909 P.2d 225, 231 (Utah 1995)). "The
findings of fact must show that the court's judgment or decree 'follows logically from,
and is supported by the evidence.' Findings 'should be sufficiently detailed and include
enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each
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factual issue was reached.'" Butler, Crockett & Walsh Development Corp., 909 P.2d at
232 (quoting Acton v. J.B. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987)). "Appellate courts
simply are not in a position to evaluate and resolve conflicting oral testimony as
accurately as a trial court. The failure of the trial court to make findings of fact is not
only reviewable, but it is reversible error." Romrell, 611 P.2d at 394.
In the instant case, the trial court held that Crusher had been unjustly enriched
when it refused to release the deposit that Crusher had received from Adventure Partners,
Ltd., during its negotiations with BCM. (R. 1297.) However, simply declaring that
Crusher had been unjustly enriched is insufficient. To support the unjust enrichment
determination, the court was required to make findings related to the three accepted
elements of unjust enrichment: 1) that a benefit was conferred upon Crusher by another;
2) that Crusher knew of the benefit; and 3) that retention of the benefit by Crusher under
the circumstances of this case would be inequitable without paying the conferee its value.
See Smith v. Grand Canyon Expeditions Co., 2003 UT 57,134, 84 P.3d 1154.
Moreover, the court must also find that the benefit had been conferred upon Crusher by
Syndicate, and not by BCM or Adventure Partners, Ltd. See id. The trial court failed to
enter appropriate findings on certain of these issues.
First, the court did not find, and in all likelihood could not find, that Syndicate
conveyed a benefit upon Crusher. Instead, the court found, and the evidence supported,
that Adventure Partners Ltd. "wired $55,325.00 to Crusher's Well[s] Fargo bank account
in Cedar City, Utah." (R. 1295; Finding 21.) The court made no findings linking
Syndicate with Adventure Partners, Ltd. Further, the court made just one finding that
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refers to Adventure Partners, Ltd, and that finding makes clear that Adventure Partners,
Ltd., and not any other entity, including Syndicate, wired the deposit to Crusher. (R.
1295: Finding 21.) In other words, the trial court failed to "include enough subsidiary
facts to disclose the steps" that led it to find that Syndicate had bestowed a benefit upon
Crusher. Butler, Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp., 909 P.2d at 232. Given the absence of
any finding that would connect Syndicate with Adventure Partners, Ltd., the trial court's
finding are patently insufficient. (R. 1294-95.)
Second, the trial court failed to articulate any findings that would support a
conclusion that Crusher's retention of the deposit was inequitable under the
circumstances. As previously discussed, the court's findings are required to include
sufficient subsidiary findings to reveal how the court arrived at its ultimate findings. See
id. In this instance, to support its ultimate finding that Crusher's retention of the deposit
would have been inequitable, the court was required to make findings that would
demonstrate the inequity. Instead, the court's findings highlight that Crusher engaged in
a business relationship with BCM at BCM's urging. (R. 1294-95.) The findings also
reveal that Crusher offered to rent an $800,000.00 piece of equipment to BCM for a
period of three months, and that BCM requested Crusher to keep the equipment off of the
market while BCM attempted to obtain financing and Crusher did so. (R. 1296.) The
court also appears to have found that Crusher was approached by a customer seeking to
purchase or rent the equipment, and that Crusher respected BCM's request to hold the
equipment off of the market refusing to sell the equipment to the other customer. (R.
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1296: Finding 28, 33.)11 In contrast, the court makes no effort to discuss how Crusher's
retention of the deposit adversely affected BCM or Syndicate, or how its continued
retention of the deposit would adversely and inequitably affect Syndicate. In fact,
nowhere in the findings does the court make any finding that Crusher's retention of the
deposit would have been inequitable. Indeed, the trial court made not a single finding
balancing the inequity that either Syndicate or BCM—let alone the Adventure Partners,
Ltd.—would suffer if Crusher retained the deposit as opposed to the inequity that Crusher
would suffer if forced to disgorge the funds that it had retained pursuant to holding the
Crushboss and related equipment off the market for BCM. In the absence of findings that
would support a conclusion that Crusher's retention of the deposit would be more
inequitable than it bearing the costs of attempting to complete the deal with BCM, the
trial court's findings are insufficient to support its conclusion that Crusher was unjustly
enriched by Syndicate.
Accordingly, because the trial court's failed to make findings of fact that support
its ultimate conclusions that Syndicate, and not any other entity, conferred a benefit upon
Crusher, and that it would be inequitable to allow Crusher to retain the deposit under the

11

In its findings discussing Crusher's customer Staker Paving, the court found that
the evidence was insufficient to determine damages that may have occurred due to
Crusher's forbearance. However, in making this finding, the trial court limited its
analysis to the period during which BCM demanded Crusher to hold the equipment off of
the market. In thus limiting its analysis, the trial court ignored the opportunity lost in
rejecting Staker Paving's request, and failed to explore the amount of time required for
Crusher to identify a replacement customer, the cost for which all should have been
ascribed to BCM, and to Syndicate by Assignment.
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circumstances, the court's findings of fact are fundamentally insufficient to support the
court's conclusion. Therefore, the judgment entered in this matter should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for all of the aforementioned reasons, this Court should reverse the
trial court's judgment and grant judgment for Crusher, or in that alternative, remand this
matter for a new trial with instructions that Syndicate is to obtain new counsel.
DATED this o ~ d a v of December, 2008.
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR, P.C.

Bryan J. Pattison
Thomas J. Burns
Cyndi W.Gilbert (4513)
991 S. Toquer Blvd.
P.O. Box 190
Toquerville, Utah 84774
Attorneys for Appellant
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This matter came on for a bench trial June 7 and 8, 2007. Plaintiff and
counterclaim defendants Syndicate Exchange Corporation and Adventure Partners,
Ltd., and third party defendants David R. Silberstein and Chapman Summit, LLC
(collectively "Syndicate"), were represented by Sam Meziani. Defendants Crusher
Rental & Sales, Inc. and Larry Eilers (collectively "Crusher") were represented by
Cyndi Gilbert. After hearing the oral testimony, weighing the credibility of the
witnesses, and considering all evidence presented, the Court hereby enters its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff Syndicate Exchange Corporation is a Texas corporation.

2.

Adventure Partners Ltd., is a Texas Ltd. partnership.

3.

Chapman Summit, LLC is a California limited liability company.

4.

David R. Silberstein is an individual and California resident,

Mr. Silberstein is the sole shareholder and sole officer of Syndicate Exchange
Corporation, president and general partner of Adventure Partners Ltd., and manager
of Chapman Summit, LLC.
5.

Crusher Rental & Sales is a Utah corporation.

6.

Larry Eilers is a resident of Las Vegas, Nevada, and at all relevant

times, was an employee of Crusher.
7.

Buttonwillow Compaction Materials, LLC (BCM) is a Nevada limited

liability company.

001293
2
636.383225vl

8.

Sean Broderick is the manager of BCM. (Trial Transcript, p. 415).

9.

In 2004, BCM entered into a contract to crush material at a gravel pit in

California.
10.

BCM did not have the crushing equipment necessary to perform the

contract, (Tr. p., 425).
11.

BCM tried but was unable to obtain financing for the crushing

equipment. (Tr. pp., 425, 432).
12.

Mr. Eilers, on behalf of Crusher, wrote a letter to BCM dated December

15, 2004 ("December Letter"). (Ex. 7).
13.

The December Letter provides in pertinent part:

a.
Rental rate for a new 5056 Crushboss Primary Crusher is
$25,000 per month. A security deposit divided into two payments of $12,500,
due with the first and second month's rent, is also required... "(Tjhe remaining
equipment financed on a lease plan."
14.

On December 16, 2004, Syndicate and BCM entered into a Joint

Venture Agreement. (Tr. p., 426); (Ex. 4).
15.

The Joint Venture Agreement references the rental of the 5056

Crushboss Primary Crusher identified in the December Letter: "The rental amount of
said crusher is $25,000 per month and the total deposit and rental payment required
to have it delivered is $55,325.00. BCM does not have the $55,325.00. Syndicate
has agreed to advance said funds." (Ex. 4).
16.

Syndicate and BCM understood that upon deposit of $55,325.00, the

Crushboss Primary Crusher and ancillary equipment would be available for delivery
to BCM. (Tr. pp., 22,66,67,210,212,427)(Ex. 4,5,12,9,10,14,15,16).
3
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17.

In 2004 and 2005, there were three ways to acquire crushing

equipment: (1) purchase, (2) rental, or (3) lease. The parties in this case
contemplated a lease arrangement.
18.

On December 15, 2004, BCM submitted a standard-form "Credit

Application" to Crusher. (Ex. 5,37).
19.

BCM did not qualify for financing. (Tr. pp., 25,29,30,37,44).

20.

BCM's approval for financing was a condition precedent to a contract

with Crusher. Because BCM was denied financing, there was no contract between
Crusher and BCM.
21.

On December 20, 2004, Adventure Partners, Ltd., wired $55,325.00 to

Crusher's Well Fargo bank account in Cedar City, Utah. (Ex. 2).
22.

On December 27, 2004, Gene Kause of BCM arrived at the Crusher

yard in Cedar City, Utah. (Tr. p., 210)
23.

Before he arrived, Mr. Kause called Larry Eilers. (Tr. p., 210). During

this telephone conversation, Mr. Kause said he had arranged transportalion to take
delivery of the equipment identified in the December Letter. (Tr. p., 210).
24.

Upon his arrival, Mr. Kause asked Mr. Eilers if he could take the

equipment from the Crusher yard. (Tr. p., 212).
25.

Crusher did not allow Mr. Kause to take the crusher and equipment

from the yard. (Tr. p., 212). Mr. Kause did not return to take delivery of the crusher
and equipment and the crusher and equipment were never delivered to BCM. (Tr. p.,
241).
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26.

There was no express agreement regarding whether the Deposit would

be refundable.
27.

When Mr. Kause arrived in Cedar City, he assured Crusher the deal

would be completed and insisted Crusher retain the crushing equipment.
28.

As a result of Mr. Kause's statements, Crusher held the equipment off

the market to provide BCM with additional time to obtain financing.
29.

Crusher reasonably relied on the statements of Mr. Kause. Crusher

held the equipment off the market in reliance on Mr. Kause's statement that there
would be a contract and the crushing equipment would be ultimately acquired.
Crusher relied on this statement to its detriment.
30.

On January 13, 2005, BCM asked Crusher to return the Deposit. In

an email to Crusher, BCM's representative stated: "Since we can't come to an
agreement...Please return the $55,325...." (Ex. 16).
31.

Any reliance by Crusher after January 13, 2005 was unreasonable.

32.

Crusher is entitled to rental income for the equipment for a seventeen-

day period from December 27, 2004, to January 13, 2005. Based on the monthly
rental charge of $25,000 per month, the daily rental charge is $806. $806 multiplied
by 17 is $13,702.
33.

Crusher claims it did not make the equipment available to Staker

Paving, a long time customer, because it was holding the equipment for BCM. No
one from Staker testified, nor was there written evidence from Staker. There is

001296
5
636 -383225v]

insufficient evidence for the Court to make a finding of damages for the period the
equipment was held by Crusher and unavailable to other customers.
34.

The Court further finds the document entitled Assignment of Cause of

Action dated August 2, 2007, a copy of which is attached to Crusher's Court Ordered
Post-Trial Memorandum, was entered into after the trial and is not competent
evidence and should be stricken.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. There is no contract which allows Crusher to retain the Deposil. Had
there been such a valid contract, Mr. Kause would have been allowed to take
possession of the crushing equipment on December 27, 2004. The fact Mr. Kause
was denied access to the equipment demonstrates there was no contract.
2. Because there is no contract, Crusher should have refunded the Deposit to
Syndicate. Crusher was unjustly enriched when it retained the full Deposit.
3. However, Crusher is entitled to an offset for its detrimental reliance under
the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Crusher is entitled to an offset of $13,702.00.
Subtracting the offset from the Deposit amount, Syndicate is entitled to judgment
against Crusher in the amount of $41,623.00 as return of the Deposit.
4. Syndicate is entitled to judgment against Crusher in the amount of
$41,623.00, together with interest at the rate of 10% per annum, from January 13,
2005, the date on which Crusher should have returned said amount to Syndicate.
Syndicate is also awarded its costs pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d).
Each party shall bear its own attorney's fees.
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5. Crusher shall take nothing on its Counterclaim against Plaintiffs and ThirdParty-Complaint against David Silberstein and Chapman Summit, LLC, and said claims
are dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this Dft'day

of May, 2008.
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Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law having been entered and accordingly,
JUDGMENT IS HEREBY ENTERED in favor of Plaintiff and Counterclaim
Defendant Syndicate Exchange Corporation ("Syndicate") in its favor and against
Crusher Rental & Sales, Inc. ("Crusher") in the amount $41,623.00, together with
interest at the rate of 10% per annum, from January 13, 2005, until full payment of
this Judgment. Syndicate is awarded its costs pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(d) Each party shall bear their own attorneys' fees. Crusher shall take
nothing on its Counterclaim against Plaintiffs and Third-Party-Complaint against David
Silberstein and Chapman Summit, LLC, and said claims are dismissed with prejudice.
ENTERED this J ^ d a y of May, 2008:
BY THE COURT:
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